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This article examines how the monetary policy tools employed 
by the Central Bank of Solomon Islands worked to achieve its 
mandated objectives of maintaining price and exchange rate 
stability during a 28-year period (1980–2007). The findings show 
that, given the current undeveloped status of the money market 
in Solomon Islands, monetary impulses are transmitted to the 
real sector predominantly through the money channel rather 
than through the interest rate channel. Until effective inter-bank 
activities develop and open market operations in central bank 
bills become regular enough to influence short-term market 
interest rates by injecting or mopping up excess liquidity, the 
central bank will have to depend on direct instruments aimed 
at monetary aggregates.
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How does monetary policy work in 
Solomon islands?
t.K. Jayaraman and chee-Keong choong
Solomon Islands is one of the six Pacific 
island countries that have independent 
currencies. The other Pacific island coun-
tries have dollarised economies.1 Of those 
Pacific island countries with independent 
currencies, Solomon Islands—along with 
Fiji, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu—has a 
fixed exchange rate regime, whereas Papua 
New Guinea has a floating exchange rate 
regime.
The country’s monetary authority, the 
Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI), 
is charged with the responsibilities of 
promoting monetary stability and a sound 
financial structure and fostering condi-
tions conducive to orderly and balanced 
economic development. Monetary stability 
implies achieving price stability in terms of 
low inflation as well as the external stability 
of its currency, the SI dollar. In recent years, 
however, the CBSI has been called on to 
play the additional role of the government’s 
agent for financing its budget deficits. 
In that situation, achieving its mandated 
objectives was a challenging task. As gov-
ernment borrowing from the central bank 
was inflationary, subsequent efforts towards 
fighting inflation and reducing pressures on 
external reserves often presented difficulties 
for the CBSI.
Similar to other Pacific island countries, 
Solomon Islands is highly dependent on 
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imports—ranging from food and fuel to 
all intermediate and capital goods. The 
CBSI, which aims to maintain gross foreign 
reserves equivalent to a minimum of three 
months’ total merchandise imports, is aware 
that foreign reserves stability is critical for 
maintaining exchange rate stability and 
price stability. There is a high pass-through 
of exchange rate changes to prices since more 
than two-thirds of the items in the basket 
for the determination of the consumer price 
index (CPI) are imported goods. 
During the past two decades, the CBSI 
has pursued its mandated objectives with 
mixed success. Its monetary policy measures 
include direct instruments such as statutory 
reserve requirements and credit control meas-
ures and indirect instruments such as open 
market operations in its own securities.
No studies have been undertaken on 
monetary policy transmission in Solomon 
Islands. This article seeks to fill the gap. 
Since the data available cover a 28-year 
period (1980–2007), we employ the bounds 
testing time series approach, which does not 
require a large sample size of data or strin-
gent requirements with regard to the order 
of integration of the variables employed.
The article is organised as follows: 
section two provides the background to 
the country’s economy and the monetary 
policy instruments employed; section 
three reviews monetary policy develop-
ments since the establishment of the CBSI; 
section four outlines various transmission 
mechanisms as studied in industrialised and 
developing economies and their limitations 
when applied to small economies; section 
five deals with the methodology adopted 
for the empirical analysis; section six reports 
the results; and section seven presents some 
conclusions and policy implications.
Background
Solomon Islands (population 489,000), 
whose key economic indicators are pre-
sented (Table 1), shares many features 
with the other Pacific island countries. The 
manufacturing base is very small—confined 
to tuna canning, palm-oil and coconut-oil 
processing and the production of soaps, 
detergents, biscuits and bread. Solomon 
Islands is heavily subsistence oriented, with 
the informal sector providing livelihoods for 
80 per cent of the population.
Table 1 Solomon Islands: recent selected key indicators
Land area (’000 sq km) 28
Population (2006: ’000) 489
Per capita GDP (US$, 2006 current prices) 684
Aid per capita in US$ (2006) 418
Aid as percentage of GDP (2006) 47.8
Annual average growth rate (percentage, 2001–07) 3.6
Annual average inflation (percentage, 2001–07) 8.6
Budget balance as percentage of GDP (2001–07) –2.1
Current account balance as percentage of GDP (2001–07) –9.5
Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2006. Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2006, 
Asian Development Bank, Manila; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific 
(UNESCAP), 2008. Economic and Social Survey 2008, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and Pacific, Bangkok.
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The country’s fixed exchange rate 
regime has served it well. Since most of the 
imports are sourced from Australia and 
New Zealand, whose central banks have 
been targeting inflation, domestic inflation 
has been kept low in recent years despite 
expanding domestic fiscal deficits. Although 
much better endowed with large land and 
marine resources than other Pacific island 
countries—with the exception of Papua 
New Guinea—Solomon Islands’ economic 
progress has been disrupted by frequent 
government changes as well as law and 
order problems.
The economic structure and growth 
have remained stagnant during the past 
three decades. The economic structure 
is characterised by a large public sector 
and a small private sector with modest 
activities. The country’s main exports have 
been timber, tuna and palm-oil. Steady aid 
inflows and assistance under the auspices of 
the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI), which was mounted in 
2005 to restore law and order, have been a 
great source of support to the country’s cur-
rent account balance, minimising pressure 
on the exchange rate.
Macroeconomic performance
The 1980s was a difficult period for Solo-
mon Islands. Decline in the terms of trade 
and the withdrawal of annual budgetary 
support by the United Kingdom left the 
country’s finances in poor shape, aside 
from the decline in international prices for 
copra, palm-oil and timber, which resulted 
in lower export earnings, Cyclone Namu in 
1986 led to declines in export volumes as 
well, as it uprooted the country’s copra and 
oil-palm plantations. The adverse impacts 
of the cyclone affected export earnings for 
the next three years. Solomon Islands had to 
seek help from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to tide it over the shortage 
in foreign reserves. Two sets of stand-by 
arrangements—the first in 1981 and the 
second in 1983—came to the country’s 
rescue. As the authorities could not fully 
meet the conditionality requirements, 
however, the full amount planned under 
the second stand-by arrangement of 1983 
could not be disbursed (Ginting and Porter 
2006).
The next decade saw a spurt in export 
earnings, thanks to controversial log 
export policies, which were questioned by 
international agencies from environmental 
protection points of view. There was an 
economic boom during the 1990s as timber 
exports to Japan, Korea and Malaysia 
reached new highs. Average annual eco-
nomic growth during the first half of the 
1990s was about 8 per cent. Exports to Asian 
countries, however, came to a sudden halt 
in the late 1990s as the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997–1998 abruptly reduced the 
demand for logs. Further, in addition to 
the fall in export earnings, the ethnic crisis, 
which exploded in 1999, severely impacted 
Solomon Islands’ economy, as physical 
infrastructure and private shops in the capi-
tal, Honiara, were destroyed in riots.  GDP 
declined throughout the next six years. All 
export- oriented projects were closed and 
international reserves were at a minimum 
level until 2003 when RAMSI arrived to 
restore law and order. In the meantime, the 
SI dollar was allowed to depreciate by 30 
per cent and inflation reached a peak of 16 
per cent.
The end of ethnic conflict encouraged 
private sector activities. Export trade in 
timber resumed in earnest. Many of the 
suspended foreign investment projects 
were revived to put the economy on a 
growth path. The annual growth rate during 
2003–2007 averaged 7 per cent. Substantial 
aid inflows averaging about 49 per cent of 
GDP helped the country to reduce the cur-
rent account deficit—which was about 24 
per cent of GDP in 2004—to a sustainable 
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level of 3 per cent in 2007. The government’s 
fiscal surpluses during 2003–2006 were also 
due to aid inflows, as well as growth in 
revenues coming mainly from export taxes 
and royalties from log exports.
In 2007, the economy grew at an impres-
sive 10.3 per cent—the highest annual growth 
in 15 years. The growth was due to massive 
expansion in logging activities, with the 
forestry sector accounting for 16 per cent 
of GDP. Exports of round logs rose by 25 
per cent. The expansion of logging at an 
unsustainable scale has brought closer the 
imminent decline of the forestry sector, which 
is now forecast to begin as early as 2010, with 
exports becoming negligible by 2014.
The volatility in fuel and food prices 
in the early months of 2008 had already 
exposed the government’s weaknesses, 
especially its fiscal management and its 
inability to resist demands for increases 
in public sector wages. In 2008, the GDP 
growth rate fell to 7 per cent—still the 
second-highest in the region, after Papua 
New Guinea, — benefiting from the mineral 
boom. As fiscal expenditure rose and with 
continued increases in private sector lend-
ing, the budget balance and current account 
balance deteriorated (CBSI 2008). The con-
tinuing global economic recession has posed 
a challenge, as log exports have been declin-
ing. In the midst of calls for a fiscal stimulus 
package to fight recession, the CBSI’s (2009) 
May 2009 Monetary Policy Statement rejected 
such a move as inadvisable.2
The annual fiscal deficits have been 
posing major problems for the CBSI, as their 
monetisation has led to excess liquidity. Fur-
ther, inflows of aid money and a credit boom 
at a high annual growth rate of 60 per cent 
during 2005–2007 have compounded the 
problem. The CBSI and the finance ministry 
have to coordinate their efforts with a view 
to reducing inflationary pressures.
Monetary policy formulation and 
implementation
Structure of the financial system and 
market
As of December 2008, Solomon Islands’ 
financial sector consisted of five institu-
tions: the CBSI, three commercial banks 
comprising one domestic bank (National 
Bank of Solomon Islands) and two foreign 
commercial banks (Westpac and ANZ), and 
one state-owned pension fund, the Solomon 
Islands National Provident Fund (SINPF) 
(Table 2). A few credit unions and a small 
insurance sector complete the financial 
sector.
Table 2 Solomon Islands financial structure, 2008
Type of institution Assets (SI$ 
million)
Assets (%) Number of 
institutions
Percentage of 
2008 GDP
Commercial banks 1,841.5 66 3 45
Credit unions 31.4 1 8 1
Insurance companies 74.2 3 3 2
Pension funds (SINPF) 856.6 30 1 29
Total 2803.7 100.0 15 68.5
Source: Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI), 2008. Monetary Policy Stance 2008, Central Bank of Solomon 
Islands, Honiara.
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As banking activities are confined 
largely to urban centres—where formal 
sector activities are concentrated—the 
deepening of the financial sector, as reflected 
in the ratios of narrow and broad money, has 
been slow. In the absence of vibrant bond 
and equity markets, there are no attractive 
financial assets other than saving and time 
deposits for savers to invest in. Following 
liberalisation of the economy, including 
the financial sector, with discontinuance of 
controls on lending and deposit rates from 
the late 1980s, the ratio of broad money to 
GDP has been on the rise.
Monetary framework
Solomon Islands’ monetary policy is 
implemented in the context of a fixed 
exchange rate arrangement according to 
which the value of the domestic currency 
is linked to a trade-weighted basket of cur-
rencies comprising the Australian dollar, 
the Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar 
and the US dollar. Two devaluations have 
taken place: one in the mid 1980s and 
another after the East Asian financial crisis 
of 1998. In 2002, soon after the law and 
order restoration efforts began, the SI dollar 
was further adjusted downwards—in all, a 
cumulative 30 per cent devaluation against 
the US dollar. These adjustments have 
contributed to keeping the real exchange 
rate more or less constant. Since 2003, 
however, the CBSI has maintained a de facto 
peg to the US dollar, effectively serving as a 
nominal anchor. As substantial aid inflows 
strengthened the reserves position, the CBSI 
was keen to maintain a stable bilateral US 
dollar/SI dollar rate rather than permitting 
an appreciation (IMF 2006).
In the initial years of their existence, 
central banks in the Pacific island countries, 
including Solomon Islands, relied on direct 
instruments.3 Direct instruments, also 
known as rules-based instruments, include: 
1) the liquid asset ratio (LAR), a requirement 
for a bank to hold a minimum amount of 
specified liquid assets, typically as a per-
centage of its liabilities; 2) the reserve ratio, 
a requirement for a bank to hold minimum 
balances with the central bank, typically as 
a percentage of its liabilities, known as a 
statutory reserve deposit (SRD) ratio; and 3) 
standing facilities, used at the initiative of 
banks and allowing banks to borrow from 
(refinance facility) or deposit funds with the 
central bank (deposit facility).
On the other hand, indirect instruments 
are linked to money market conditions. 
These are used at the discretion of the central 
bank and they bear an interest rate. They 
include open market operations conducted 
by the central bank as a participant in the 
money market. They involve: 1) buying/
selling bonds issued by the government 
and government agencies in the secondary 
market, and buying/selling assets under 
a repurchase agreement in the repurchase 
agreement market, or foreign exchange 
swaps; and 2) open market-type operations, 
which are monetary operations based on 
auction techniques that are regulated by the 
central bank. They involve primary market 
issuance of the central bank’s own securities 
or government securities issued exclusively 
for monetary policy purposes (IMF 2004).
Until 1989, the CBSI did not have 
any indirect instruments (Box 1). It relied 
on direct instruments, including LAR 
and direct controls on credit. In 1989, it 
launched open market operations (OMO) 
in its own 91-day paper, known as Bokolo 
bills, for mopping up excess liquidity. Fiscal 
dominance and sovereign defaults through 
the 1990s, however, led to the closure of 
domestic securities markets and, ultimately, 
discontinuance of Bokolo bills. They were 
reintroduced and discontinued between 
1992 and 1996. During the interregnum, 
the CBSI conducted liquidity management 
operations by using separately issued 
treasury bills (T-bills). As the CBSI was 
undertaking OMO in T-bills, it was under 
How doES monEtary Policy worK in Solomon iSlandS?
81
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
pressure. Caution was needed to ensure 
that the issuance of new T-bills did not 
undermine budget discipline (IMF 2005).
Given these circumstances, Solomon 
Islands in recent years used LAR to the full-
est extent to reduce liquidity in the banking 
system and for fighting potential inflation-
ary pressures. The LAR, which was as high 
as 40 per cent until 1998, was reduced in 
1999 to 7.5 per cent of deposit liabilities. 
Since the CBSI has used T-bills for liquid-
ity management, LAR requirements now 
exclude T-bills as eligible assets. Currently 
for LAR calculations, the only eligible assets 
are the deposits by commercial banks with 
the central bank. Since there is limited scope 
for an inter-bank money market to develop 
in the near future, and there is no secondary 
market for T-bills, indirect instruments are 
not likely to emerge as a reliable monetary 
Box 1 Solomon Islands monetary policy instruments
Liquid asset ratio (LAR)
Banks are required to maintain a balance of liquid assets for each working day amounting to not 
less than 7.5 per cent of deposit liabilities. Before November 2008, the qualified liquid assets were 
cash and deposits with the CBSI. In November 2008, cash was removed from the definition of liquid 
assets.
Liabilities qualifying for the purpose of the requirements include
demand deposits1. 
savings deposits2. 
time deposits3. 
deposits by non-residents4. 
foreign currency deposits by residents.5. 
Standing facilities
Secured advanced facility (SAF): This facility is intended to assist banks with short-term liquidity 
problems or needs due to specific market situations. This is in accordance with the principal 
objectives under Section 4 of the CBSI Act. The maturity term of the facility is seven days and the 
interest rate is 2.5 per cent above the interest rate on earning assets as determined by the CBSI. The 
minimum advance is SI$1 million.
Open market operations
Treasury bills: The CBSI auctions treasury bills with maturities of 7, 14, 28 and 56 days. Originally 
introduced in the early 1980s, the sales were discontinued in mid 1995. 
They were revived about 1999 and were continuing. A cap of SI$30 million was introduced by the 
CBSI for total T-bills sales. While the instrument remains with the CBSI, the government incurs the 
cost.
Bokolo deposit facility: This facility was introduced in late 2008 by the CBSI with fixed-term 
maturities of 12, 18 and 24 months. Interest rates on the facility are 4, 4.25 and 4.5 per cent. The 
deposit amount is negotiable. The purpose behind the facility is to absorb excess liquidity in the 
banking system.
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policy instrument. Commercial banks have 
to look to standing facilities offered by the 
CBSI for meeting liquidity needs, which 
should eventually develop as a discount 
facility. Further, as a major departure from 
past practices, the CBSI has now allowed the 
Solomon Islands National Provident Fund 
to invest overseas up to 30 per cent of its 
investment portfolio (about US$20 million), 
which has considerably reduced domestic 
liquidity (IMF 2008).
Solomon Islands ran budget surpluses 
during 2003–06 thanks to substantial aid 
inflows, which helped meet recurrent 
and investment expenditure. In 2007 and 
2008, however, the public sector wage bill 
rose as the opposition was pressing the 
government to accommodate the claims of 
the civil service to offset the rise in the fuel 
price. The rise in food prices in 2008 also 
led the government to eliminate the goods 
tax and import duty on rice. With the likely 
fall in revenues—including export taxes 
and royalty revenues in the light of the 
expected decline in timber exports—larger 
fiscal deficits are anticipated. Monetary 
conditions have been tightened since 2008, 
when there was a credit boom—especially 
growth in personal loans. Further tighten-
ing of monetary conditions will be needed 
if fiscal deficits cannot be prevented (CBSI 
2008). Since the authorities are maintain-
ing a de facto peg with the US dollar with 
a view to containing inflation, rather than 
allowing currency depreciation that would 
only contribute to increases in landed prices 
of imports, it is all the more necessary to 
absorb excess liquidity. Direct instruments 
are likely to play a more dominant role 
(IMF 2008).
In fact, the CBSI (2005) has indicated 
the possibility of a larger role for direct 
instruments in the near term. These include 
credit ceilings, changes in LAR and stand-
ing facilities if increases in money growth 
present problems preventing the realisation 
of the CBSI’s objectives. No doubt each has 
drawbacks: increases in LAR, if unremuner-
ated, would be a tax on intermediation. 
Bank-by-bank credit ceilings would also 
distort intermediation. The use of a deposit 
facility has quasi-implications. On the other 
hand, use of an indirect instrument, the 
Bokolo bills, runs the risk of fragmenting 
the sovereign debt and would also involve 
costs (Porter 2005).
In Pacific island economies, which have 
shallow financial markets with a small 
number of participants, mopping up struc-
tural excess liquidity is not easy. Absorbing 
excess liquidity through open markets, 
using either government-issued securities or 
the central bank’s own paper, would result 
in overshooting of interest rates and market 
volatility (IMF 2004, 2005). In these circum-
stances, as the CBSI (2005) has indicated, 
employment of direct instruments including 
LAR and other quantitative measures such 
as credit ceilings would be more effective, as 
they directly affect the volume of liquidity.4 
The experiences of other Pacific island 
countries are also relevant here.5
Monetary policy transmission 
in Pacific island countries: some 
limitations
Monetary policy transmission is described 
as a process through which changes in 
monetary policy influence aggregate 
demand, output and the price level. The 
impact of monetary policy decisions on GDP 
is through its influences on consumption 
and investment decisions of households, 
businesses and financial intermediaries. At 
least six channels through which monetary 
policy has an impact on economic activities 
have been identified: 1) the interest rate 
channel; 2) the money supply channel; 3) the 
credit channel; 4) the balance sheet channel; 
5) the asset price channel; 6) the exchange 
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rate channel; and 7) the expectations channel 
(Mishkin 1995, 1996, 2001, 2006).
Limitations in the island economies
There are constraints on the efficiency of 
transmission mechanisms acting through 
various channels. One of the constraints 
faced by all Pacific island countries, includ-
ing Solomon Islands, and by countries in 
the Caribbean region is that in the absence 
of a well-developed financial sector and 
a vibrant secondary market, in which 
financial assets can be traded with ease and 
speed, the interest rate channel does not 
operate effectively (Worrell 2000; Fairbairn 
and Worrell 1996).
The balance sheet approach presup-
poses that financial assets are important 
constituents of firms’ and consumers’ 
portfolios and assumes the existence of 
convertibility between illiquid (consumer 
durables) and liquid (financial) assets. 
Empirical studies have shown that markets 
for assets in the Pacific island countries and 
the Caribbean region have not attained 
sufficient sophistication to function as an 
efficient conduit for monetary policy (Baksh 
and Craigwell 1997). A recent study (Dabla-
Norris and Floerkemeir 2006) notes that the 
inability of banks in developing countries 
to assess credit risk properly, due to weak 
risk-management expertise and opaque 
corporate accounting practices, increases 
banking spreads and reduces the effective-
ness of the balance sheet channel.
With reference to the asset price channel 
mechanism and its variants of Tobin’s q 
theory (valuation of equities), the required 
precondition—namely, the presence of 
financial assets constituting a key compo-
nent of borrowers’ and wealth holders’ 
portfolios—does not exist in any Pacific 
island country. Further, commercial banks 
dominate the financial sector, since the 
non-bank financial sector institutions (stock, 
debt securities and mortgage market, and 
insurance industry) are still in their infancy. 
Market financing therefore does not matter, 
largely precluding the asset price channel 
working through wealth and income effects 
(Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeir 2006).
For full efficiency, the exchange rate 
channel transmission mechanism presup-
poses a floating system, which adjusts to 
capital flows. Since Solomon Islands has 
adopted a fixed exchange rate regime, this 
particular channel does not operate. In view 
of the constraints discussed above, it is more 
likely that in small island economies with 
undeveloped money markets, monetary 
pulses are transmitted to the real sector 
through the money channel rather than 
through the interest rate channel. The next 
section undertakes an empirical investiga-
tion to test the hypothesis that changes in 
monetary aggregates are more important 
than changes in the interest rate.
Variables, data and methodology
For the empirical study, the choice of 
variables is constrained by data availability. 
Further, the modelling methodology has to 
remain simple, given the limited number of 
annual observations (1980–2007), affording 
a small number of degrees of freedom. For 
the analysis, we chose two policy variables 
— the monetary aggregate and the interest 
rate. The monetary aggregate is represented 
by broad money. The interest rate is proxied 
by the average lending rate, since there is 
not a consistent data series for the short-
term interest rate in Solomon Islands. 
The target variables are real output, 
which is represented by real GDP (RGDP), 
and the price level, which is represented 
by the CPI (P). Besides these variables, we 
include the nominal exchange rate, to check 
whether it could be a transmission channel. 
The nominal exchange rate is expressed as 
units of the US dollar per unit of domestic 
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currency.6 The annual data for the empiri-
cal study are drawn from two sources: the 
monetary and exchange rate data from 
international financial statistics published 
by the IMF (2008) and output data from 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB 2008) 
and UNESCAP (2008). We can summarise 
output and monetary statistics during the 
period 1980–2007 (Table 3).
Bounds testing approach
Since the number of annual observations—
only 28—is not large enough for estimating 
a long-run money and output model, we 
resort to the autoregressive distributed lag 
(ARDL) procedure developed by Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith (2001). The ARDL bounds 
testing model is a general dynamic speci-
fication that applies lags of the dependent 
variable and the lagged and contempora-
neous values of the explanatory variables 
through which short-run impacts can be 
directly assessed and long-run relation-
ships indirectly estimated. Further, bounds 
testing allows tests for the existence of a co-
integrating relationship between variables 
in levels, irrespective of whether the under-
lying regressors are I(0) or I(1) (Pesaran and 
Shin 1999; Pesaran, Shin and Smith 2001). 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) established that 
the estimators of the short-run parameters 
were consistent and that the estimators of 
long-run parameters were super-consistent 
in small sample sizes.
There are two steps involved in esti-
mating the long-run relationship between 
money, output and other variables. The 
first step is to test for the existence of a 
long-run relationship among all variables 
in the equation. Once a long-run relation-
ship is confirmed, the long-run coefficients 
are estimated using the associated ARDL 
model. For econometric analysis, all vari-
ables are duly transformed into their natural 
logs. To examine for co-integration by the 
bounds test proposed by Pesaran, Shin and 
Smith (2001), models are constructed for 
estimation purposes (Equations 1–5).
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Table 3 Solomon Islands output and monetary statistics
Years/period RGDP  
(%) 
Inflation  
(%)
Interest rate 
(%)
Exchange 
rate US$/SI$
M1 (% of 
GDP)
M2 (% of 
GDP)
1980–89 7.4 12.5 13.3 0.77 12.2 30.1
1990–99 2.9 10.7 16.2 0.30 14.2 28.5
2000–04 –2.1 8.2 14.5 0.16 15.9 26.6
2005 5.0 7.3 14.1 0.13 24.0 38.5
2006 6.2 11.2 13.9 0.13 27.5 42.6
2007 5.4 7.7 14.1 0.13 32.9 49.0
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2008. Staff Report of Art IV Mission, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.
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tLER tt LPLRGDP 1251155 
(5)
In Equations 1–5, ∆ is the first difference 
operator and the εit are white noise error 
terms. The joint significance of the lagged 
levels in these equations is examined using 
the F-test, in which the null and alternative 
hypotheses are expressed as follows.
For Equations 1–5
H0 : β1i = β2i = β3i = β4i = β5i = 0
(there is no long-run level relationship) 
H1 : β1i ≠ β2i ≠ β3i ≠ β4i ≠ β5i ≠ 0 
(there is a long-run level relationship)
in which i = 1,2,...,5.
The distribution of the F-statistics is 
non-standard under the null hypothesis 
and testing the hypothesis. If the computed 
F-statistic is greater than the upper critical 
bound value, the null hypothesis of no co-in-
tegration is rejected, irrespective of whether 
the variable is I(0) or I(1). In contrast, when 
the F-statistic is smaller than the lower 
critical bound value, the null hypothesis 
is not rejected, and we conclude that there 
is no long-run level relationship between 
the variables under study. If, however, the 
computed F-statistic lies between the lower 
and upper critical bound values, there is 
inconclusive inference unless the order of 
integration of the series under consideration 
is clearly examined.
Results and discussion
Bounds testing results
The results of the bounds tests are reported 
(Table 4).7  The computed F-statistics for 
the real output equation suggest rejection 
of the null hypothesis of no co-integration. 
The null hypothesis is, however, not rejected 
for other equations. This finding shows that 
there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between real output, prices, the money 
variable (M2), the interest rate and the 
exchange rate. 8
86
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
The results of estimation of an unre-
stricted error correction model (UECM) 
for real output are reported (Table 5). The 
short and long-run elasticity estimates are 
presented (Table 6). The model is adequate 
since the results of a battery of tests indicate 
that the disturbance terms are normally 
distributed and are serially uncorrelated 
with the residuals, confirming the model has 
the correct functional form (Table 5: Panel 
III). Moreover, the CUSUM and CUSUM of 
squares plots show that the parameters of 
the model are stable over time.9
As shown in Table 6, the estimated long-
run coefficient of the money variable (M2) 
has a positive sign, which is also found to be 
statistically significant. The estimated coef-
ficient of price, which has the theoretically 
expected sign, is also significant. Although 
the coefficient on the interest rate variable 
has a positive sign, it is not statistically 
significant. The exchange rate coefficient 
has a positive sign in the short run and a 
negative sign in the long run, indicating 
that a devaluation strategy would not be 
effective in stimulating economic growth in 
the short run but would lead to an increase 
in the long run.
Variance decomposition analysis
Since the variables are all I(1), we resort to the 
VAR model in first differences for conduct-
ing the variance decomposition analysis.10 
We order the policy variables first—namely, 
the monetary aggregate (LM2), the interest 
rate (LIR) and the exchange rate (LER)—
followed by the target variables: prices (LP) 
and real output (LRGDP).11 The results of 
the decomposition analysis of real output 
are shown (Table 7).
Real output in Solomon Islands is 
very sensitive to its own shocks and the 
money variable. It is found that substantial 
variability in output—about 82 per cent—is 
explained by its own shock in the first 
year,  and that this slowly decreases in the 
Table 4 Bounds test results
Dependent variable Computed F-statistic
LRGDP 8.877***
LP 1.3304
LM2 0.4546
LIR 1.1478
LER 1.7097
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001)a
Critical value Lower bound value Upper bound value
1 per cent 3.41 4.68
5 per cent 2.62 3.79
10 per cent 2.26 3.35
a Critical values are obtained from Pesaran, M.H., Shin, Y. and Smith R., 2001. ‘Bounds testing approaches to the 
analysis of level relationships’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 16:Table CI(iii) Case III: Unrestricted intercept and 
no trend, p. 300. 
* significant at 10 per cent 
** significant at 5 per cent 
*** significant at 1 per cent
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Table 5 ARDL model for real output (LRGDP) equation 
I. Results
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Probability
LRGDPt-1 –0.2689 –2.2743* 0.0525
LP t-1 –0.9463 –5.4096*** 0.0006
LM2 t-1 0.4892 5.7576*** 0.0004
LIR t-1 0.1518 1.0632 0.3187
LER t-1 –0.5328 –3.4015*** 0.0093
C 1.4037 2.0074* 0.0796
∆LRGDP t-2 –0.7748 –4.3700*** 0.0024
∆LRGDP t-4 –0.4191 –2.7408** 0.0254
∆LRGDP t-6 0.4080 2.1807* 0.0608
∆LP t-2 –0.9125 –2.0553* 0.0739
∆LM2 0.3908 5.8180*** 0.0004
∆LIR t 0.1066 0.7807 0.4574
∆LER t-2 0.5493 3.9619*** 0.0042
II. Model criteria/goodness of fit
R-squared 0.9327 Akaike info criterion –4.4187
Adjusted R-squared 0.8317 Schwarz criterion –3.7721
SE of regression 0.0232 F-statistic 9.2389***
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.9372 Probability(F-statistic) 0.0020
III. Diagnostic checking
a) Autocorrelation (Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test): 
F(1) = 0.0061 [0.9399] F(2) = 0.1579 [0.8574]
F(3) = 0.6404 [0.6211] F(4) = 0.8154 [0.5760]
b) ARCH test:
F(1) = 1.5038 [0.2359] F(2) = 2.1074 [0.1540]
F(3) = 2.0486 [0.1533] F(4) = 1.0607 [0.4175]
c) Ramsey RESET specification test:
F-statistic = 2.8593 [0.1342]
* significant at 0.1 marginal level 
** significant at 0.05 marginal level 
*** significant at 0.01 marginal level 
Notes: Lag length given in parentheses and probability value stated in square brackets; C represents the 
intercept term, ∆ is the first difference operator.
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Table 6 Short-run and long-run elasticities 
Variable Short run Long run
LP –0.9125* –3.5194***
LM2 0.3908*** 1.8193***
LIR 0.1066 0.5644
LER 0.5493*** –1.9815***
Intercept - 5.2203*
- zero 
* significant at 0.1 marginal level 
** significant at 0.05 marginal level 
*** significant at 0.01 marginal level
Table 7 Variance decomposition analysis for real output
Period SE LRGDP LP LM2 LIR LER
1 0.0567 82.4254 0.0000 14.2634 1.1933 2.1179
2 0.0803 60.8904 0.0152 29.0145 4.1351 5.9448
3 0.0980 45.8006 0.8971 36.4032 12.1980 4.7012
4 0.1142 35.0764 1.5263 41.5001 17.7048 4.1924
5 0.1261 29.2333 2.8088 43.2820 19.6528 5.0232
6 0.1341 25.8282 3.9443 44.0887 20.0011 6.1378
7 0.1387 24.5240 4.6719 44.0363 20.2426 6.5251
8 0.1410 25.0721 4.9017 43.2965 20.2062 6.5235
9 0.1427 26.6954 4.8763 42.2618 19.7600 6.4064
10 0.1450 28.2930 4.7235 41.4673 19.3091 6.2072
Notes: Cholesky ordering—LM2, LER, LIR, LP and LRGDP. We tried different orderings of the variables but the 
findings were robust to changes (see Note 12).
Table 8 Variance decomposition analysis for prices
Period SE LRGDP LP LM2 LIR LER
1 0.0213 0.3876 67.9721 24.8599 0.1086 6.6718
2 0.0250 6.4640 60.2950 20.4680 1.9942 10.7789
3 0.0303 11.5993 46.4619 21.5488 3.5503 16.8397
4 0.0350 9.9921 35.8344 22.6296 6.3277 25.2162
5 0.0406 9.1061 27.2472 23.0266 9.1104 31.5098
6 0.0457 10.0115 21.6223 21.9673 12.5010 33.8979
7 0.0506 12.1981 17.7795 20.2227 14.8443 34.9555
8 0.0549 14.6638 15.1483 18.1360 15.7582 36.2937
9 0.0588 17.3018 13.2746 16.1377 15.6721 37.6138
10 0.0622 20.0716 11.9384 14.4329 15.2224 38.3347
Notes: Cholesky ordering—LM2, LER, LIR, LP and LRGDP. We tried different orderings of the variables but the 
findings were robust to changes (see Note 12).
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Impulse response analysis
The impulse response function (IRF) ena-
bles us to trace the response of output to a 
shock in the policy variable. The shock is 
represented by a one standard deviation of 
the error term in the underlying structural 
model for the variable. Since all variables are 
measured in log form, the impulse response 
functions trace a growth rate relative to 
the base period when the shock occurred. 
The IRF has an additional advantage— it 
indicates whether the effect is positive or 
negative. For investigating the IRF with 
regard to the output model by the Choleski 
decomposition, we adopt the same ordering 
of variables as for the variance decomposi-
tion analysis.
The response of output to shocks in 
the monetary policy variables and prices 
is shown (Figure 1). A shock to prices has a 
negative impact—although negligible—on 
output, which is also not significant. The 
response of real output to a shock in the 
monetary aggregate is not only positive, 
it increases significantly over the first two 
years, as the lower confidence interval (the 
two standard deviation band denoted by 
a dotted line) crosses the zero line. The 
response of real output to a shock in the 
interest rate is not significant as the lower 
two standard deviations are below the zero 
line for the entire time horizon. The response 
of real output to a shock in the exchange rate 
is negative and significant.
medium term (fifth year) to 29 per cent, 
and to about 25 per cent in the long run (at 
a 10-year horizon). The monetary aggregate 
explains 14 per cent of the variability in 
output in the short run, increasing to 43 
per cent in the medium term, and thereafter 
steadying at about 42 per cent. In contrast, 
real output is not very responsive to the 
interest rate and the output response to the 
exchange rate is the least.
With regards to the price level (Table 8), 
the analysis shows that about 68 per cent 
of the variability in prices is explained by 
its own shock in the first year. The impact 
declines, however, over the rest of the 
time horizon. The money variable is the 
most important determinant in explain-
ing the variability in prices—in the short 
and long run. Twenty-five per cent of the 
variability in prices is explained by the 
monetary aggregate in the first year, and 
the proportion steadies at about 23 per 
cent in the medium term and declines to 
14 per cent in the long run. A shock to the 
interest rate has a negligible effect on prices 
in the short run as well as in the medium 
and long term. Only about 7 per cent of the 
variability in prices is explained by a shock 
of the exchange rate in the first year. Over 
time, however, the impact of the exchange 
rate on prices increases to 32 per cent in 
the fifth year and climbs to 38 per cent in 
the long run.
Table 9 Correlation matrix of the reduced form of the VAR residuals
LRGDP LP LM2 LIR LER
LRGDP 1 0.1730 0.3777 0.0892 –0.0629
LP 0.1730 1 0.4986 0.0297 –0.1477
LM2 0.3777 0.4986 1 –0.1433 0.2102
LIR 0.0892 0.0297 –0.1433 1 –0.2940
LER –0.0629 –0.1477 0.2102 –0.2940 1
Note: See Note 11.
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The results of variance decomposition 
and the impulse response function analysis 
lead us to conclude that monetary aggre-
gates play a significant role in explaining 
changes in output and the price level, 
whereas the effect of changes in the interest 
rate on output and price is not statistically 
significant.
Summary and conclusions
The monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism in industrialised and developing 
countries has been well documented in a 
growing body of empirical literature. There 
is, however, no such study on Solomon 
Islands, which is one of the five Pacific 
island countries with an independent cur-
rency under a fixed exchange rate regime. 
The responses of prices to shocks in M2, 
the interest rate, the exchange rate and real 
output are shown (Figure 2). Prices respond 
immediately and significantly to changes in 
real output—that is, prices decline sharply 
in the first two years and then slowly steady 
over the rest of the time horizon. Prices are 
seen to be very sensitive to monetary shocks 
in the first year as prices rise quickly and 
decline quickly, as the lower confidence 
interval line (dotted line) crosses the zero 
line just before the second year. Thereafter, 
the decline is not significant. The response 
of prices to shocks in interest rates is not 
significant throughout the period, as the 
confidence interval line is well below the 
zero line. Prices respond negatively and 
quickly to shocks in the exchange rate, and 
the response is significant.
Figure 1 The results of impulse response function analysis for real output 
Response to Cholesky One S.D Innovations ± 2 S.E
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LRGDP to LP
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LRGDP to LM2
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LRGDP to LIR
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LRGDP to LER
 
How doES monEtary Policy worK in Solomon iSlandS?
91
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
This article is an attempt to fill the gap 
by undertaking an investigation into how 
changes in monetary policy influence the 
real sector in Solomon Islands. The financial 
sector in Solomon Islands is small. Treasury 
bills dominate the money market, which 
is shallow with few participants, just as 
long-term government bonds saturate 
the capital market. Further, there are no 
secondary markets for short and long-term 
debt securities.
The findings of the study are: 1) there 
is a long-run relationship between real 
output, prices, monetary aggregates, the 
interest rate and the exchange rate; 2) in the 
long-run relationship between real output 
and the independent variables tested, the 
interest rate does not play a significant 
role; and 3) monetary aggregates play a 
major role. Further, variance decomposition 
and impulse responses function analysis 
show that the monetary aggregate is the 
most significant variable in explaining the 
changes in real output and the price level in 
Solomon Islands.
These conclusions are consistent with 
the findings of studies in most of the devel-
oping world that money markets are not the 
principal conduit of monetary policy shocks. 
The policy implications are that, given the 
current nature of the money market and 
the limited government debt instrument 
holdings, monetary easing can be resorted to 
only through foreign exchange operations. 
With a wider daily trading band, and with 
the exchange rate pegged to the US dollar, 
which has recently been depreciating against 
all major currencies, a depreciation of the SI 
Figure 2 The results of impulse response function analysis for prices
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dollar would enable the country to earn 
greater reserves. The banks are required to 
sell foreign exchange to the central bank 
under the existing limits, which will increase 
domestic liquidity. The IMF has been advis-
ing the CBSI to issue short-term bills of 28 
days’ maturity to manage liquidity, which 
will eventually facilitate development of 
greater inter-bank activity. 
Until effective inter-bank activities 
develop and open market operations in 
CBSI bills become regular enough to influ-
ence short-term market interest rates by 
injecting or mopping up excess liquidity, the 
CBSI has to depend on direct instruments 
aimed at monetary aggregates.
Notes
1 The dollarised economies, which use one 
of the three major regional currencies as 
legal tender, are  Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu 
(AU dollar); Cook Islands and Niue (NZ 
dollar); Marshall Islands, Federated States 
of Micronesia and Palau (US dollar).
2 The Monetary Policy Statement (CBSI 2009) 
issued in May 2009 says ‘It would not 
however be appropriate for Solomon Islands 
to implement such a program at this juncture 
as the cost would be prohibitive, it would 
encumber the nation with further debts and 
provide very little boost to the economy given 
the supply constraints of the economy and 
the dependence on foreign demand.’ 
3 W hen the central bank uses direct instruments, 
its aim is to change the balance sheets of 
commercial banks. By so doing, there is a 
one-to-one correspondence between, say, 
the credit ceiling and commercial loans. On 
the other hand, when the central bank uses 
indirect instruments, the aim is to change its 
own balance sheet. For example, if the central 
bank undertakes sales of its own security, 
it acquires additional reserves, thereby 
absorbing funds from the economy. If there is 
a stable relationship between reserve money 
and aggregate demand, indirect instruments 
will be effective.
4 The IMF (2004) observed that there were 
insufficient market instruments for liquidity 
management, noting the existing excess 
reserves were almost six times the stock of 
T-bills and almost twice the T-bill issuance 
permitted under the then existing prospectus 
(SI$100 million).
5 The IMF (2005) reported that central banks in 
Tonga and Vanuatu had to rely eventually on 
imposing bank-by-bank credit ceilings and 
raising LAR for controlling liquidity. The IMF 
(2005) cites the experiences of industrialised 
countries in this regard: the use of reserve 
requirements (Spain), mandatory deposits 
(Mexico and The Netherlands) and moving 
deposits from commercial banks to the 
central bank (Malaysia and Thailand).
6 The reason for using the nominal exchange 
rate is that one can isolate changes in the 
nominal exchange rate on real economic 
activity separately from changes in prices. 
Since the real exchange rate is already 
adjusted for changes in prices, using the 
real exchange rate would make it difficult 
to isolate price changes (inflation) from 
exchange rate changes (Dabla-Norris and 
Floerkemeir 2006).
7 Although the bounds-testing procedure 
did not require testing for unit roots, we 
undertook the investigation and found all 
the variables were I(1). The test results will 
be made available on request.
8 Narayan and Smyth (2005) have extensively 
discussed the inclusion of a time trend 
variable in the estimation. Since the time 
trend variable was found to be insignificant 
in our first-stage estimations, we decided to 
omit it.
9 The figure is provided in the Appendix.
10 We are grateful to Professor Gary Koop 
for advice on this point through personal 
correspondence.
11 We tried different orderings of the variables. 
With a view to evaluating the robustness of 
the VAR results—which varied according 
to different orderings of the variables and 
different lag lengths—the correlation matrix 
of the reduced-form VAR residuals based on 
the ordering was examined. The elements 
of the correlation matrix between M2 and 
the rest of the variables are low, indicating 
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that contemporaneous feedback is not a 
problem. These correlations suggest that 
the ordering of the variables in the Choleski 
decomposition is not of any major concern 
(see Table 9).
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Figure A1 Plot of CUSUM test for real GDP (LRGDP) equation
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Figure A2 Plot of CUSUM of squares test for real GDP (LRGDP) equation
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